

Best Practices and Controls for Mitigating Insider Threats



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Agenda

- Introduction
- Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, 4th Edition
 - 19 Best Practices
- Technical Demonstration(s)



CERT Insider Threat Center—Mission

Assist organizations in identifying indications and warnings of insider threat by

- performing vulnerability assessments
- assisting in the design and implementation of policies, practices, and technical solutions

based on our ongoing research of hundreds of actual cases of insider IT sabotage, theft of intellectual property, fraud, and espionage

Definition of Insider Threat

The CERT Program's definition of a malicious insider is a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who meets the following criteria:

- has or had authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data
- has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's information or information systems

Methods

- Research
- Empirical Evidence
- Contarol Hypothesis
- Control Implementation and Testing
- Control Pilot
- Revisions
- Release



Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, 4th Edition

Who does the CSG apply to?

- Information Technology / IT Security
- Physical Security
- Software Engineering
- Data Owners
- Legal
- Human Resources
-everyone across the organization

New Features

- Mappings to other best practices / standards
 - NIST 800-53
 - ISO 27002
 - CERT RMM
- Quick wins & High Impact Solutions
- Quick reference guide

Practices you are familiar with

Consider threats from insiders and business partners in enterprise-wide risk assessments.

Clearly document and consistently enforce policies and controls.

Institute periodic security awareness training for all employees.

Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior, beginning with the hiring process.

Anticipate and manage negative workplace issues.

Track and secure the physical environment.

Implement strict password and account management policies and practices.

Enforce separation of duties and least privilege.

Consider insider threats in the software development life cycle.

Use extra caution with system administrators and technical or privileged users.

Implement system change controls.

Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions.

Use layered defense against remote attacks.

Deactivate computer access following termination.

Implement secure backup and recovery processes.

Develop an insider incident response plan.

New Best Practices

- Practice 9: Define explicit security agreements for any cloud services, especially access restrictions and monitoring capabilities.
- Practice 16: Develop a formalized insider threat program.
- Practice 17: Establish a baseline of normal network device behavior.
- Practice 18: Be especially vigilant of emerging social media trends.
- Practice 19: Close the doors to unauthorized data exfiltration.


Define explicit security agreements for any cloud services, especially access restrictions and monitoring capabilities.

- Conduct a Risk Assessment before entering into any agreement.
- Chose a cloud service provider that meets or exceeds the organization's own levels of security.
- Understand how the cloud provider protect data and other assets.

Develop a formalized insider threat program.

- Work with Legal Counsel.
- Requires involvement from various departments across the organization.
- Share information.

Insider Threat Team



Note: Text below the separator in each box notes the federal government's equivalent position



Establish a baseline of normal network device behavior.

- Know what is normal and abnormal for a given system.
- Excessive traffic, Insufficient traffic
- Store logs for 60 days or longer

Be especially vigilant regarding social media.

- Train users to be aware of what they post
- Small disclosures of information can create bigger problems
- Develop a social media policy

Close the doors to unauthorized data exfiltration.

- Understand how data can leave the organization.
- Control removable media.
- Watch for "old school" methods: printers, copiers, etc.



Technical Controls: Preventing Data Exfiltration

The Problem

 Organizations need to use web based services on a daily basis for business needs. However, services that offer the ability to upload attachments present an opportunity for sensitive data to leave the organization.

 Communications that are secured with SSL encryption are difficult to inspect and therefore it is difficult to detect and prevent sensitive data from leaving the organization.

Data Loss Through the Web

Difficult problem

Perfect exfiltration channel

- **Encrypted**
- Appears "normal"
- Send many files at once
- Possibly essential to operations









What can be done to prevent this?

Options:

- Implement policies regarding how sensitive information is disseminated
- Full packet capture of all Internet traffic for further analysis
- White listing
- 4. Block all webmail services
- 5. Allow all webmail services and cross your fingers
- 6. Or...

CERT's Solution

- Allow proxied Internet access to any website
- Inspect encrypted communication sessions for sensitive documents
- Block sensitive attachments from being uploaded to the Internet


Blocking Documents

Documents can be stopped based on three methods:

- Block all attachments
- 2. Keywords
- 3. Tags

The Proxy Server

Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Proxy




The Proxy Server Main Components


- Ubuntu Linux Version 10.04 LTS
- Squid Version 3.1.19
- C-ICAP
- Clam Antivirus (ClamAV)

Client Configuration


- The Organization's Certificate needs installed in the Trusted Root Certificate Store on each client
- Internet Explorer needs to be configured to use the proxy on port 3128 for HTTP/S traffic

Both of these settings can be configured using Group Policy












URL	Status	Domain	Size	Remote IP	Timeline
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	302 Moved Temporarily	accounts.youtube.com	212 B	10.64.22.15:8080	112ms
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	200 OK	mail-attachment.googleusercontent.com	43 B	10.64.22.15:8080	44ms
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Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Proxy




Squid's HTTP Request Logging

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image/gif
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                 101 10.0.3.100 TCP MISS/200 491 GET https://mail.google.com/mail/images/c.gif? - DIRECT/74.125.225.86 image/gif
                 160 10.0.3.100 TCP MISS/200 502 POST https://mail.google.com/mail/ota? - DIRECT/74.125.225.86 text/plain
1331070432.096
1331070432.894
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Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Proxy




Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Proxy

RegEx: mail.google.com/mail/ota*

POST https://mail.google.com/mail/ota?zx=24i9nkai14gs

Success!



Shortcomings

- Not very granular
- Doesn't account for the scenario where text is copied and pasted into an email

Detection using ClamAV


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For Official Use Only

Detection using ClamAV

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Detection using ClamAV





Plagiarism Detection & DLP


Solution:

- What if we could inspect all text flowing through the network?
- Rather than look for 'tags' or keywords, look for similarity
- How do we test document similarity?
- Cosine similarity algorithms
 - Laymen's terms: Plagiarism Detection
 - Even though we're not checking for plagiarism in academic papers, the process is virtually identical


The Plagiarism Detection Method

- Rather than asking
 - "Does any text in this <u>document</u> sufficiently match anything within its <u>cited references</u>?"
- We're asking
 - "Does any text in this <u>outgoing network traffic</u> sufficiently match anything within our <u>repository of</u> <u>intellectual property</u>?"
 - If not send it through
 - If so create an alert and/or actively block the traffic from leaving the organization's perimeter

Plagiarism Detection



Plagiarism Detection in DLP



Open Source Tools

Squid proxy server

Apache Lucene

Apache Tika

GreasySpoon ICAP server









Apache Lucene

- Powerful open-source text indexer and search engine
- Used in IBM's famous Watson AI system
- Scalable, fast, and mature
- Perfect for our needs



Order of Events

User sends a webmail message

Proxy receives the webmail message

Proxy forwards the webmail message to GreasySpoon ICAP server

GreasySpoon ICAP server forwards the webmail message to Apache Lucene indexer

Apache Lucene indexer 'scores' the outgoing text against all indexed documents containing intellectual property

If any computed score exceeds the organization's defined threshold (ex: 50%), either create an alert and/ or block the outgoing webmail message

Shortcomings

- Tuning the threshold is difficult
- Does not detect encodings other than ASCII or Unicode
- Processing intensive
- Large index (lots of duplicated data)
- Index contains sensitive information

Future Work

- Create an efficient open-source DLP framework for correlating any given input data with any set of data, regardless of their type (i.e. text, image, raw)
- Tagging network traffic with usernames and other attribution information
- Improving our "Tagger" tool to automatically store file usage information within documents when they are created/accessed/modified

Upcoming Control Topics

- Two Man Control For Operating Systems
 - Why is it so hard?
- Better Forensics for Insider Threat Indicators
 - How to use what we know more effectively

Point of Contact

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Insider Threat

http://www.cert.org/insider_threat/

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